We introduce a new identity management process in a setting where users' identities are credentials for anonymous authentications. Considering identity domains organized in a tree structure, where applying for a new identity requires to previously own the parent identity, we enable a cascade revocation process that takes into account this structure while ensuring anonymity for non-revoked users, in particular, towards the providers of other identity domains. Our construction is based on the group signature scheme of (Bringer and Patey, 2012).
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we consider a scenario where users have access to a kind of federation of identity management systems with different identity providers that have some dependencies between them: To each identity provider corresponds an identity domain and the set I of these domains is structured as a tree. When one wants to apply for a new identity in an identity domain I l , one has to own a valid identity for the parent domain I k . These dependencies also imply that it should be possible to automatically revoke across different domains. To this aim, the new identity is derived from the previous ones in order to maintain a link with the identities above. Contrary to what is done in centralized federated identity management, one important issue is then to ensure the privacy of this link. We call this property Cross-Unlinkability Let us give an example of application of our proposal. Consider the identity domain (sub-)tree described in Figure 1 . We assume that a government sets up an identity management system, used for instance to access services. In this example, applying for an identity stating that you own a car insurance requires to previously own an identity in the domain of users with driver's licenses. We also wish that, when a user uses his student identity, anonymity of this user is guaranteed against the providers of all other domains, including the managers of the parent domain (National Identity), the children domains (Colleges) or the sibling domains (Driver's license).
We use as elementary component of our system a biometric anonymous authentication scheme (Bringer et al., 2008) (BCPZ) based on Verifier-Local Revocation (VLR) group signatures (see Figure 2 ). This protocol enables members of a group, managed by a Group Manager GM, to authenticate, using an electronic device, to a service provider while proving nothing more than their belonging to the group. The use of biometrics guarantees that the legitimate user uses the device and this, combined to the use of a group signature scheme, leads to an anonymous remote authentication. We can see the group considered in such a scheme as an identity domain I l , where the identity provider IP is the GM. The keys that are issued by IP are actually credentials that are associated to the issued identity. In the following, these credentials will be assimilated to the identities. The users that obtained an identity from IP can prove its validity to service providers that rely on this identity domain. We recall that group signatures enable authorized users to sign anonymously on behalf of a group. We only consider the case of VLR group signatures. The VLR property (Boneh and Shacham, 2004) guarantees that only the public parameters and a revocation list RL are required to check a signature. Concretely, when a user is revoked, a revocation token derived from his signing key is added to RL. It is used by verifiers to prevent revoked users from further signing.
To reach our goal of Cross-Unlinkability, we use the group signature introduced in (Bringer and Patey, 2012) (which patches and extends (Chen and Li, 2010) ) that satisfies Backward Unlinkability. This property enables users to sign at different time periods using the same keys, while maintaining unlinkability between signatures issued at different periods, even if the user is revoked at one of these periods. In our proposal, we no more consider these periods as time periods but as children of a given identity in the identity domain tree. Thus, authentications in two different domains are impossible to link if the user is not revoked from both. Moreover, the cascade revocation process that we describe does not threaten the security properties that we guarantee.
THE CL AND BP GROUP SIGNATURES
In this section, we describe the model of group signatures presented in (Bringer and Patey, 2012) . We instantiate this model using two schemes introduced in (Bringer and Patey, 2012) : a patched version of the (Chen and Li, 2010) scheme, denoted by CL, and an extension of this patched version with Backward Unlinkability (BU), denoted by BP. Notice that both can be used with the same parameters.
Components
There are three types of entities: a Group Manager GM, a set of members and a set of verifiers. A BP or a CL Group Signature Scheme consists of the following algorithms. (Moreover, in the BP scheme, because of BU, all algorithms but KeyGen depend on the current time period j and one revocation list RL j per time period has to be used (see also Remark 1)).
KeyGen. The group manager outputs the group public parameters gpk. He also chooses a secret key msk and its public counterpart mpk. gpk and mpk are published. GM also publishes an empty revocation list RL.
Join. This algorithm is an interactive protocol between GM and a member M i . M i gets a secret key Verify. This algorithm, run by a verifier takes as input a message m, its signature σ and the Revocation List RL. It checks if the message has been signed by an unrevoked group member, without revealing the signer's identity. The possible outputs are valid and invalid.
Open. This algorithm is run by GM. It takes a signature σ on a message m as input, together with all revocation tokens of the group members. It reveals the identity of the signer.
Security Properties
We describe the security properties fulfilled by the group signature schemes. Remark 2 (BCPZ Anonymous Authentication). We describe in Figure 2 how to adapt the BCPZ anonymous authentication scheme using the CL scheme. We refer the reader to (Bringer et al., 2008) for further details. Notice that in our adaptation, we use the property of Exculpability enabled by the CL scheme and we do not give any biometric data to the GM.
OUR PROPOSAL

The Model
We assume that identity domains are organized as a tree I with a root I 0 . When one wants to acquire a new identity from a domain I l , one has to prove that one owns a valid identity for its parent domain I k in I. Each identity domain I l has an identity provider IP l and we will denote by k ≺ l the fact that the identity domain I k is the parent of the identity domain I l .
For each identity that they own, the authorized users possess the necessary keys to authenticate anonymously following the principle of the BCPZ scheme. The corresponding IP is in fact the group manager for the underlying group signature scheme. The functionalities of our protocol are the following.
KeyGen. This is run by the IP's. IP 0 first returns the public parameters gpk for all the domains. Then each IP l creates a secret/public key pair (msk l , mpk l ) and publishes mpk l . Revocation. This recursive algorithm is run by the identity provider IP l of I l who wants to revoke a member M i of I l . It takes as input the revocation token rt l i of the user M i and the revocation list RL l .
Enrolment
• Local Revocation: It returns an updated RL l where the revocation token of M i for I l is added.
• Downwards Revocation (compulsory): The newly published revocation token rt l i is sent to the IP's of the domains that are children of I l , who then run the Revocation algorithm.
• Upwards Revocation (optional): IP l sends an information rt k≺l i to IP k , where I k is the parent of I l , who can then decide to revoke (in that case we will say that the upwards revocation has been accepted) or not the user, using rt k≺l i to retrieve the user's identity for I k . 
Remark 3 (Revocation
Security
The main security property that we require from our scheme is that an authentication in a given domain remains anonymous even for the providers of the other identity domains, for instance of the sibling domains in I. We insist on the fact that, in case of revocation, if IP l does not inform the provider IP k of the parent identity I k of I l that a given user is revoked from I l , then IP k is not able to know about the identity of this user. We call this property Cross-Unlinkability (CU). CU is an adaptation of Selfless-Anonymity. Additionally, we directly adapt the security properties a), c) and d) of VLR group signature to our setting of identity management.
The Construction
We instantiate our algorithms using the CL and BP group signatures, as follows.
KeyGen. IP 0 runs the KeyGen BP algorithm of the BP group signature to generate the public parameters gpk of the scheme. Then each IP l , including IP 0 , creates a key pair (mpk l , msk l ) compatible with gpk. The msk l 's are kept secret by the IP's. gpk and all the msk l 's are published. The IP's also agree on a set of period tokens h k≺l , that are used for the Derivation from I k to I l . We need, for each internal node I k in the tree I, to set one period "k ≺ l" per child I l of I k .
Enrolment. We assume that M i has fulfilled all the conditions to acquire an identity from the domain I l . to a service provider P requiring to belong to I l is merely a BCPZ authentication using the group signature parameters for the domain I l . Concretely, when a user wants to prove to P that he owns an identity, he selects his associated device, connects it to a trusted sensor that communicates with P. The sensor checks using biometrics that the legitimate person is using the card, reads the keys on the card and signs a challenge message sent by P.
Derivation. We now explain how to derive identities. Let I k be the parent domain of I l in I and let us assume that a user M i owns an identity for I k and wants to acquire an identity for the domain I l . M i has to engage a specific authentication process with the identity provider IP l .
First, the user authenticates to IP l , viewed as a service provider for I k to prove validity of his identity in I k However, he uses the BP signature at period k ≺ l instead of the CL scheme. M i also sends the revocation token rt k≺l i corresponding to the k ≺ l period. IP l checks the validity of the signature using Verify CL and checks that the token is the good one using Verify BP with a revocation list set as {rt k≺l i } (which should fail during the Revocation Check). If all tests succeed, IP l computes x l i = Hash(msk l ||rt k≺l i ), which is then used as input for the Enrolment algorithm. This derivation process is described in Figure 3 . 
Remark 4 (Explanations on the Derivation Process
